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True philosophy consists of relearning how to look at the world
— Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2002, p. xxiii)
Th is philosophy paper addresses the question of why phenomenology is the best 
research method for investigating visual perception of screen media, or screen sense. 
Disciplines cannot be justifi ed adequately by assumptions that give rise to them. A 
scientist’s duty to question founding assumptions is satisfi ed only by stepping outside 
one’s own tradition to acquire a critical perspective. Th us, integrity in scientifi c 
inquiry rests on openness to criticism from perspectives outside one’s own traditions, 
a consciousness of tolerance. Phenomenology claims for itself a capacity for such 
critical self-refl ection and openness to multidisciplinary debate1. In summary, 
methodological validity for the study of screen sense begins with a phenomenologist’s 
1 Pilotta, J. J. & Mickunas, A. Science of communication: Its phenomenological foundation. 
Hillsdale, N.J: L. Erlbaum Associates. 1990.
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openness to criticism and moves through critique of other perspectives toward an 
authentic, unified investigation.
Naturalism is the prevailing theoretical standpoint of the positive sciences, such 
as physics, chemistry, and physiology. The natural standpoint assumes that the only 
valid experiences are caused by empirically detectable objects of the material world 
(positivism). Later disciplines of economics, sociology, and psychology adopted positive 
science’s cause-and-effect logical empiricism; accordingly, internal psychological 
states are correlated one-to-one to external events (psychologism). Any internal events, 
such as thoughts or emotions, are assumed to be responses to empirical causes.2
The phenomenological movement arose to respond to the failure of the natural 
standpoint’s cause-and-effect thinking to answer important questions about the 
meaning of human existence, questions that dwell in the “in-between” region at the 
nexus of internal and external life. Figure 1 visualizes the philosophical standpoint 
of phenomenology as located at the center of a methodological critique of the 
natural standpoint – in the region between mind-subject and world-object, between 
psychologism and positivism, and between idealism (mentalism) and empiricism. 
As the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty3 says, “It is into this in-
between that we must try to advance”. Phenomenology emphasizes the lived body’s 
situation in the world, which turns out to be vital for understanding screen sense. The 
methodological critiques in this paper do not claim that psychologism and positivism 
are wrong within their own objectivities. Rather, the claim here is that phenomenology 
takes up experiential investigations of screen sense that do not fit within positivism or 
psychologism. In sum, critical appraisal of the disciplines will enable science to situate 
spectator consciousness in its appropriate epistemological context. 
Figure 1. Methodological Critique of the Natural Standpoint 
and the Philosophical Standpoint. Illustration by author.
2 Pilotta and Mickunas, supra note 1, pp. 24–25.
3 Merleau-Ponty, M. Signs. (R. C. McCleary, Trans.). Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University 
Press. 1964. p.166.
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The proceeding sections of this methodological critique follow the chronological 
development of the disciplines: 1. Positivism: is screen sense a physical fact? 
2. Psychologism: is screen sense a mental construct? 3. Common sense: what are the 
natural standpoint’s presuppositions about screen sense? 4. Epoché: Can naturalistic 
presuppositions about screen sense be neutralized? 5. Eidetic reduction: how can the 
essence of screen sense be obtained from screen phenomena? 6. Conclusion. The goal 
of this methodological critique is to assert the phenomenological method’s validity 
for human research in general and for screen sense in particular.
1. Positivism: Is screen sense a physical fact?
Based on the philosophy of logical empiricism, the procedural steps for 
positivism’s scientific method are well known. Positivist theory of science boasts 
many accomplishments in the material realm of human endeavors – such as curing 
diseases, boosting food production, controlling the environment, harnessing energy, 
increasing labor efficiency, and building transportation and communications 
networks. 
Positivism’s ideology also prevails (sells) in the world of screen entertainment. 
Popular U.S. TV courtroom, police, and procedural investigation dramas celebrate the 
indubitability of physical evidence. The immensely popular “reality” shows cynically 
trade on the audience’s faith in a positive existence with constructed performances 
that pass for reality. Television news and sports promulgate the positivist ethos 
of empirical eye witnessing, crystalized in the “live” broadcast and “slow-motion 
replay.” The movies have equivalent examples in the fantasy genres, which foster 
their own founding “realities” paralleling the spectator’s empirical existence. 
However, in the field of philosophy, positivism’s efforts to explain human 
consciousness have been much less successful, owing to the inaccessibility of mental 
processes to logical empiricism. First of all, cause-and-effect, the ruling proof for 
knowledge in the positive domain, cannot be experienced empirically; no encounter 
with two empirical facts labeled cause and effect can legitimate their connection. 
Their link can be forged only by idealistic, non-empirical logic, such as statistics.4 
Secondly, positivism cannot show that certain mental states cause specific behaviors 
or vice-versa; such demonstrations are limited to equivocal expressions of association, 
difference, and tendency. For example, eyestrain is a subjective experience not 
reducible to empirical components. Even with verified observations of behavior 
(duration of screen exposure) or measurements of biological functions (dilation of the 
pupil of the eye), such correlations of external and internal events fail to demonstrate 
causation. Bound by its requirement for externally verifiable evidence, positive science 
does not accept self-reports of subjective experience (“I feel eyestrain.”) because they 
4 Husserl, E. Experience and Judgement: Investigation in a Genealogy of Logic. Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press. 1973. p. 392.
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are not “objective.” No amount of procedural rigor will enable positivism to bridge the 
“in-between” region separating the empirical world from consciousness.
Positivism operates according to certain untested, unnoticed assumptions, which 
merit closer scrutiny. One assumption concerns the nature of scientific knowledge. 
According to logical empiricism, the only valid knowledge that science can have is 
caused by objects of the physical world and associated psychological events – the 
constancy hypothesis. This hypothesis asserts that human perception is consistent, 
and that the same stimuli will produce the same sensations; i.e., human sense organs 
are passive transmitters.5 Though most positivist scientists do not question that non-
empirical human experiences not traceable to physical reality do indeed occur, but 
they simply are regarded as valueless to science. 
Some aspects of screen sense strenuously resist reduction to empirical facts. The 
screen-mediated apparition itself is difficult to circumscribe empirically. Can it be 
captured wholly by patterns of retinal and tympanic stimulation? Can contextual 
factors of environment, memory, and association be observed and measured? Can 
spectating be reduced to stimulation of specific regions of the human brain, as 
physiologists have attempted?6 Even if such reductionist explanations were feasible, 
wouldn’t they overlook mental activities of a spectator’s consciousness negotiating 
with the screen? Screen sense does not reside in a spectator’s brainpan, nor in the 
screen medium, but instead between spectator and screen – a region not accessible to 
research tools calibrated strictly for material reality. 
Another reason for positivism’s failure to access screen sense is its banishment 
of direct, personal experience from scientific judgment – so-called self-elimination. 
7This hallmark of the scientific method can be traced back to the fourteenth century 
invention of the clock, which gave birth to the modern conception of time, attention 
to observability and reproducibility of events, and the “romanticism of numbers”.8 All 
phenomena are assumed to be reducible to empirical data interpretable simultaneously 
by all observers. Unobservable subjective states are considered non-objective 
and unreliable. Sampling techniques are devised to remove data inconsistencies. 
Individuating “error” factors hampering generalization are “controlled.” Positivism’s 
anti-subjective bias traps it in the paradoxical position of denying its own subjectivities 
necessary for observation, measurement, and theory formation. Generalizations are 
derived from atomistic empirical particulars without consciousnesses to perform the 
observing and generalizing. The usual generalizing function, statistical probability, is 
assumed to provide objective results based on laws of logic, but even these results must 
5 Merleau-Ponty, M. Phenomenology of perception. (C.  Smith, Trans.). London: Routledge. 
2002. p. 9.
6 De Kerchove, D. Connected intelligence: The arrival of the web society. Philadelphia: Kogan 
Page. 1998.
7 Merleau-Ponty, supra note 3, p. 99.
8 Mumford, L. The monastery and the clock. In Technics and civilization. New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World. 1963. p. 332.
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be absorbed, interpreted, and communicated by humans. Positivism is not able to 
account for the subjectivities embedded in its assumptions and method. 
Positivist science’s urge to eliminate personal judgment from the production 
of knowledge also has disembodied intelligence.9 Elimination of bodily experience 
from empirical observations is particularly problematic for a study of spectating’s 
embodied performance. How a spectator interpolates embodied audiovisual 
perspectives from watching an episode of a TV sitcom, enacting a virtual persona in 
a multiplayer online role-playing game, piloting a spaceflight simulator, or browsing 
a social networking website can never be derived from spatio-temporal data points 
provided by kinesthetic analysis of observed organic movements. The embodiment of 
screen experience defies positivist reduction. 
Phenomenologists do not deny or discount the accomplishments of positive 
science in general10 or positive contributions to empirical realities impinging on 
communication phenomena in particular.11 As phenomenology’s founder, Edmund 
Husserl12 said, “Science is alone concerned with the experienceable real fact-world”. But 
his lament for positivism is that it is not positive enough – it does not go deep enough 
into the facts as they present themselves in direct experience to allow for complete 
knowledge: “If by ‘Positivism’ we are to mean the absolute unbiased grounding of 
all science on what is ‘positive,’ i.e., on what can be primordially apprehended, then 
it is we [phenomenologists] who are the genuine positivists.”13 By “primordially,” 
Husserl means a deep probing of consciousness prior to self-awareness and prior to 
imposition of metaphysical constructs such as scientific laws. By “apprehended,” he 
means constituting (grasping) the essence of a whole thing interpolated from a stream 
of fragmentary sensory impressions. Phenomena of screen-mediated things are not 
reducible to the impressions. Phenomenologists attempt to probe beneath the fact-
surface of phenomena such as screen specters to discover transcending structures of 
consciousness, such as meaning, essence, and typology.14
2. Psychologism – Is screen sense a mental construct?
As a young professor of mathematics in the 1880s, Husserl searched for verification 
of psychologism’s claim that mathematics and logic do not have a priori validity outside 
9 Weizenbaum, J. Computer power and human reason: From judgment to calculation. San 
Francisco: W. H. Freeman. 1976.
10 Patton, M. Q. Qualitative evaluation and research methods (2nd ed.). Newbury Park, Calif.: 
Sage Publications. 1990. p.14.
11 Pilotta and Mickunas, supra note 1, p. 34.
12 Husserl, E. Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology. (W. R. B. Gibson, Trans.). 
New York: Collier Books. 1962. p. 74.
13  Husserl, supra note 12, p. 78.
14 Pilotta and Mickunas, supra note 1, p. 34.
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of psychology. He became intrigued with psychologist Franz Brentano’s new method 
of introspection to probe for the origin of logic in one’s own thoughts. A decade later, 
public refutation of Husserl’s investigations by the respected mathematician and 
philosopher Gottlob Frege15 Husserl to conclude that logic and mathematics cannot 
be grounded in psychology, and, further, that there are no psychological images or 
representations between awareness and its objects. Consequently, Husserl’s first 
book on his new phenomenology, Logical Investigations16, emphatically distinguishes 
phenomenology from psychology and rejects all forms of psychologism.
Because virtually anything having to do with psychology has been labeled 
psychologism at one time or another17, we need to clarify what Husserl rejected. He said 
psychologism starts with the premise that the human mind is a closed box, the inner 
workings of which cannot be observed directly by others. Following from the closed 
box premise is the conclusion that introspective examination of one’s own thoughts 
and feelings cannot be validated by others and therefore has no scientific validity. 
Behavioral psychology moved in this direction of discounting introspection.18
For Husserl, psychologism’s denial of introspection raises problems. As a 
method, psychologism requires observers of behavior but paradoxically locates the 
observing consciousnesses outside its system and does not account for them. As a 
theory, the psychologistic standpoint leads to the conclusion that logic and science 
have no universal validity apart from empirical validity. All criteria for distinguishing 
the logical superiority of one thought to another are banished. In effect, logic is 
eliminated. For example, the psychologistic standpoint does not recognize the law 
of non-contradiction. A contradictory statement such as, “I can hear the sound and 
I cannot hear the sound,” is regarded by psychologism as merely a description of an 
observed response to a private experience. A judgment that such a statement is false 
requires a prescriptive logical framework prior to experience and outside of empirical 
reality, but psychologism prohibits such idealistic frameworks. 
As empirical particulars never can demonstrate universality, psychologism 
ultimately collapses into relativism – truth is only what an individual person thinks it 
is. Relativism leads to another contradiction. If all truths are individual and private, 
then there can be no universal truths for all people for all times, yet the denial of 
15 Frege, G. Review of Dr. E. Husserl’s philosophy of arithmetic. In F. Elliston & P. McCormick 
(Eds.), E. W. Kluge (Trans.), Husserl: Expositions and appraisals. Notre Dame, Ind: University 
of Notre Dame Press. 1977. pp. 314–324.
16 Husserl, E. Logical investigations. (J. N. Findlay, Trans.). London: Routledge and Keegan Paul. 
1970.
17 Pelletier, F. J., Elio, R., & Hanson, P. (2008). Is logic all in our heads? From naturalism to 
psychologism. In StudiaLogica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, 88(1). 2008. p.6; 
Ströker, E. Husserlian foundations of science. (L. Hardy, Ed.). Washington, D. C.: Center for 
Advanced Research in Phenomenology & University Press of America. 1987. p. 83.
18 Stewart, D. & Mickunas, A. Exploring phenomenology: A guide to the field and its literature (2nd 
ed.). Athens: Ohio University Press. 1990. pp. 17–18.
Russell J. Cook. Methodological Critique for Screen Sense: a Case for Phenomenology32
universal truths is itself a universal truth.19 Logicians attempting to resolve the 
contradictions of psychologism in the light of more recent discoveries of cognitive 
science have encountered mixed results.20
3. Common sense: What are the natural standpoint’s 
presuppositions about screen sense?
The phenomenological reduction or epoché illuminates presuppositions of the 
natural standpoint taken by positivism and psychologism and factors them out of 
phenomena. Another term for naturalistic presuppositions is common sense – our 
barely noticed coping with the world that we take for granted. Common sense helps 
us literally to make sense of the world, to make it cohere for us. Schutz21 says the 
phenomenological method starts with common sense: “Common-sense thinking 
simply takes for granted, until counter-evidence appears, not only the world of 
physical objects but also the sociocultural world into which we are born and in which 
we grown up. This world of everyday life is indeed the unquestioned but always 
questionable matrix within which all our inquiries start and end”.
Media spectating typically entails layer upon layer of background commonsense 
presuppositions. Some are easily recognized. Others are more difficult to ferret out. 
Three levels of presuppositions operate within screen sense – the practical level, the 
existential level, and the ontological level. At the practical level are habitual behaviors. 
Spectators function on “automatic pilot.” Screen technologies are unnoticed in 
their being taken for granted, or “ready to hand.” However, occasional problems 
with technologies cause the “ready-to-hand” to be is noticed in its absence – such 
as missing a television remote control, or encountering dropped cellular telephone 
coverage.22
Screen media content, despite its ephemeral nature, also has an aspect of being 
“ready-to-hand.” Beneath the practical level of living are naturalistic presuppositions 
that found the existential coherence of screen media spectating. A common example 
of the presumed “ready-to-hand” in screen sense is the mode of appearance known 
as direct address23, in which a person on screen makes eye contact with the spectator 
(see Figure 2). A mutual exchange of eye gazes between spectator and screen figure is 
19 Pilotta and Mickunas, supra note 1, pp. 7–11.
20 Pelletier, F. J., Elio, R. & Hanson, P. (2008). Is logic all in our heads? From naturalism to 
psychologism. In StudiaLogica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, 88(1). 2008. pp. 
61–62.
21 Schutz, A. Collected papers. (M. A. Natanson& H. L. van Breda, Eds.). The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff. 1962. pp. 326–327.
22 Heidegger, M. Being and time. (J. Stambaugh, Trans.) (Revised.). Albany: State Univ. of New 
York Press. 2010, pp. 68–69.
23 Zettl, H. Sight sound motion: Applied media aesthetics (7th Ed.). Belmont, CA: Cengage. 2013. 
pp. 234–235, 323–324.
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an embodied gesture that powerfully conveys recognition of the spectator as “ready-
to-hand.” A spectator prereflectively responds in a consistent manner to eye gazes 
across all media contexts, whether in a feature film, video chat, or television newscast. 
Only in reflective self-awareness (when we think about it) does it occur to us that the 
screen figure seeming to look at us might not in fact be seeing us.
Figure 2. Direct address illustrating naturalistic presupposition of the “ready-to-hand”  
in screen consciousness. Illustration by author.
In normal, non-screen socializing, we take for granted that a reciprocal exchange 
of eye gazes means something special. Deconstructed phenomenologically, the 
“look”24 reveals multiple layers of meaning: (a) an appearance of another person in 
the perceptual field (other-as-object); (b) an awareness of being looked at (self-as-
object); (c)  recognition of the other person’s awareness (other-as-subject); (d) the 
other person as a concrete instance of the possibility of there being other people in 
my world (other-as-intersubjectivity); and (e) the self is not the other and the other 
is not the self – a mutual understanding that Sartre calls negation or alienation. These 
latent layers of meaning gain their potency in the instant that our eyes exchange 
glances with another person, regardless of whether the exchange is mediated by an 
audiovisual screen. 
In summary, direct address in screen media functions in the immediacy of two 
levels of naturalistic presumptions about the world. At the practical level, direct 
address is a spectator’s access to a virtual “ready-to-hand” other person. At a deeper, 
existential level of the natural standpoint, direct address functions as a bond between 
the self and the other. The power of the eye gaze in mediated situations creates a 
24 Sartre, J. P. Being and nothingness: An essay on phenomenological ontology. (H. E. Barnes, 
Trans.). New York: Philosophical Library. 1956. pp. 374–383.
Russell J. Cook. Methodological Critique for Screen Sense: a Case for Phenomenology34
suspension of belief. As spectators in a movie theater, for example, we know that the 
movie star appearing to look directly at us from the silver screen in fact cannot see 
us. Yet, to be caught in the movie star’s stare is so powerful a gesture that it startles us 
into self-consciousness. The same is true for a video chat.
Deep beneath the practical level of living and the existential level of spectating 
are more fundamental, usually unexamined, presuppositions about being in the 
world – the ontological. Rarely does one question one’s own ontology, except in 
special contexts such as philosophizing or spiritual reflection. We perpetually carry 
our ontological beliefs with us like shadows and rarely question them. Ontological 
beliefs of the natural standpoint – including belief in the existence of a reality that 
is independent from consciousness – found the positive sciences, but they present a 
major obstacle to phenomenology.
The natural standpoint regards consciousness as merely another thing in the 
world – a passive, interior receptacle for psychological impressions of external things 
and forces. Phenomenology regards consciousness as far more than just a thing 
among things – it is an active collaborator with the world. To the natural standpoint, 
consciousness that is in the world and at the same time collaborates with the world 
appears paradoxical.25 According to Husserl, making consciousness into a thing “is 
the basic mistake of psychologism (to which not only all empiricists and but also 
rationalists succumb). Whoever saves us from the realization of consciousness is the 
savoir of philosophy, indeed the creator of philosophy”.26
4. Epoché: Can naturalistic presuppositions about screen sense  
be neutralized?
This paper’s preceding critiques of positivism and psychologism establish 
phenomenology’s general antipathy to reductive, overly simplistic explanations of 
consciousness. Husserl’s discovery of a new way of understanding human experience – 
the philosophical standpoint – eclipses the natural standpoint of the positive sciences, 
including psychology. Embree and Dudash27 note that the central insight of Husserl’s 
mature philosophy was the discovery of the philosophical standpoint, which can move 
acts of consciousness, such as screen sense, out of the ordinary (natural standpoint) 
and into the extraordinary (philosophical standpoint). This transformation is 
25 Van Manen, M. Researching lived experience: Human science for an action sensitive pedagogy 
(2nd ed.). Albany: State University of New York Press. 1990. p. 3.
26 Kern, I. The three ways to the transcendental reduction in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. 
In F. Elliston & P. McCormick (Eds.), Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals (pp. 126–149). Notre 
Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press. 1977. pp. 144–145; italics added.
27 Embree, L. &Dudash, M. A representation of Edmund Husserl [1859–1938]. Wilfred Laurier 
University, Waterloo, Ont.June, 1988. [interactive]accessed June, 2014 at <http://www.
lesterembree.net/husserlscript.htm>
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accomplished, first of all, by starting from a point free of presuppositions – taking 
no aspect of a phenomenon for granted. Regarding screen sense, nothing is assumed 
by phenomenology – not the spatio-temporal world, not scientific theories about the 
world, not other human beings, not one’s own body, not even logic. The only possible 
validation of cognitive experience of screen sense is itself.28
Husserl discovered a way to free consciousness from the natural standpoint—
the phenomenological reduction or epoché – first announced in his Lectures on the 
Thing of 1907.29 By a powerful act of reflection, we can seize our realist assumptions 
in order to suspend or “neutralize” them.30 In the epoché, everything is scrutinized, 
and nothing is taken for granted.31 Ströker32 says the epoché or phenomenological 
reduction reveals to us how we make sense of the world: 
“[The phenomenological] reduction opens up a new domain 
of experience which has hitherto been completely unknown: a 
domain of intentional activities in which being, existence, reality, 
and ideality – ascribed to objects and events themselves in the 
natural attitude – gain their proper sense from those activities 
alone. In other words, transcendental consciousness is the ultimate 
‘source’ of all sense-bestowing achievements thanks to which there 
is a world, or, for that matter, science.”
The phenomenological reduction or epoché is not a “narrowing” of standpoint 
in the positivist sense of reducing objective existence to a single dimension. Rather, it 
“widens” an investigator’s standpoint from the natural to the philosophical, revealing 
the objective world in its correlation to subjective acts of experience. The objective 
theme is contained within the new universal theme. This shift of standpoints in 
reflective consciousness is analogous to a transition from thinking in terms of two-
dimensional area to thinking in terms of three-dimensional space, which contains in 
itself the second dimension and transcends it.33
The epoché’s transformative power has elicited numerous metaphors from 
commentators. Ströker says the epoché is a “way of seeing things just as they are”34 
28 Farber, M. The foundation of phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the quest for a rigorous 
science of philosophy. Piscataway, N. J.: Transaction Publishers. 1962. pp. 211–220.
29 Husserl, E. The idea of phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1964.
30 Ströker, E. Husserlian foundations of science. (L. Hardy, Ed.). Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Advanced Research in Phenomenology & University Press of America. 1987. p. 4.
31 Küng, G. The phenomenological reduction as epoché and explication. In F. Elliston & P. 
McCormick (Eds.), Husserl: Expositions and appraisals (pp. 338–349). Notre Dame, Ind: 
University of Notre Dame Press.1977. p.343
32 Ströker, supra note 30, p. 5.
33 Kern, supra note 26 , p. 127.
34 Ströker, supra note 30, p. 6.
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and “utter strangeness”.35 The epoché’s deep understanding of experience conforms 
to the original meaning of the word reduction, from the Latin reductio, meaning 
to lead back. The epoché leads back to the ground of all knowledge – pre-reflective 
experience – fulfilling Husserl’s goal to make phenomenology a first philosophy. 
From his 1907 lectures through to the end of his career, Husserl refined, extended, 
and restated the epoché. Two-thirds of the Crisis, according to Husserl’s editor, is 
devoted to explicating it.36 “There is probably no question over which Husserl spent 
more time – or to which he more often returned…”.37 The epoché has a companion 
procedure, the eidetic reduction, an analysis for deriving the essences of phenomenal 
objects. Spiegelberg38 and Ströker39 separately note that Husserl does not specify 
the sequence of the two reductions (the phenomenological and the eidetic), as they 
serve different purposes, nor are both procedures required. Full understanding and 
appreciation of the reductions comes only with doing them.40 
The first step in performing the epoché is to suspend judgment concerning 
the existence or non-existence of reality. Husserl expresses the reduction variously 
as “inhibiting,” “turning off,” “putting out of action,” or “detaching importance 
from” questions of what is “real” and what “exists”.41 Husserl42 is emphatic that the 
phenomenological reduction does not doubt or deny the existence of the natural 
world in the manner of Cartesian doubt. Rather, the phenomenological reduction 
brings the natural standpoint’s unexamined assumptions into sharp, clarifying relief, 
so that they may be separated from what directly appears to consciousness – the 
“given”. The given is evidence that the subject is not a passive spectator of the world, 
but an active co-conspirator with it.43
Perception of pictorial depth is a good example to demonstrate how the epoché 
is performed. Common sense tells us that a pictorial artifact such as a photograph is 
a flat object with no thickness, having no real depth. Therefore, any sense of depth 
35 Ströker, E. Investigations in philosophy of space. (A. Mickunas, Trans.). Athens: Ohio 
University Press.1987, p. 85
36 Biemel, W. The decisive phases in the development of Husserl’s philosophy. In R. O. Elveton 
(Trans.), The phenomenology of Husserl: Selected critical readings (pp. 148–173). Chicago: 
Quadrangle books. 1970. p. 167.
37 Merleau-Ponty, supra note 3, p. xii.
38 Spiegelberg, H. The phenomenological movement: A historical introduction (3rd rev. and 
enl.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1982. pp. 708–711.
39 Ströker, supra note 30, p. 6–7.
40 Ihde, D. Experimental phenomenology: An introduction. Albany: State University of New York 
Press.1986.p.14; Ströker, E. Husserlian foundations of science. (L. Hardy, Ed.). Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology & University Press of America. 1987. 
p. 8.
41 Spiegelberg, supra note 38, pp. 118–123.
42 Husserl, supra note 12, p.100.
43 Merleau-Ponty, M. The structure of behavior. (A. L. Fisher, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press. 
1963, p. 220.
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that we get from looking at a picture, such as the landscape in Figure 3, must be the 
result of an illusion or trick of the eyes. Yet, the same common sense tells us that 
nearly everybody in normal life, including young children, easily and instantly can 
see depth in many different kinds of pictures. Indeed, mass media companies bank 
on the assumption that their audiences see pictorial depth in screen images.
Figure 3. An example of pictorial depth. Photo by author.
Psychological aesthetics44, a discipline of the natural standpoint, particularizes 
pictorial “depth cues,” including: height in the visual field (in the photo, the 
mountains are above the road), occlusion (the rocks in front of the water), relative size 
(progressively smaller road markers), linear perspective (lines of the guardrail and 
road converging to a point), distance to horizon (mountains closer to horizon than 
the road), aerial perspective (distant mountains pale and blurred), texture gradient 
(less detail in distant mountains), attached shadows (shadows on the guardrail), and 
cast shadows (shadow under the guardrail). Note that the spectator registers these 
depth cues prior to psychological recognition of categories of lived world things 
(road, guardrail, lake, mountains, clouds) or depth relationships revealed by motion. 
Photographers and painters are encouraged to learn about these depth cues and to 
use them strategically in picture making.
If we apply the epoché to aesthetic assumptions about pictorial depth, our 
perspective is shifted from the natural standpoint to the philosophical standpoint, 
and we are opened immediately to an undeniable, self-evident sense of depth in the 
landscape in Figure 3. The philosophical standpoint suspends all concern for illusions 
44 Arnheim, R.Art and visual perception: A psychology of the creative eye(New version, expanded 
and rev. ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press.1974. pp. 245–302; Zettl, H. Sight sound 
motion: Applied media aesthetics (7th Ed.). Belmont, CA: Cengage. 2013. pp. 160–175.
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or tricks. With the existence and reality questions neutralized, we can begin to see 
pictorial depth phenomenally, that is, without theoretical reservations.
5. Eidetic Reduction: How can the essence of screen sense be 
obtained from screen phenomena?
By applying Husserl’s variational method45 to the phenomenological reduction 
of the natural standpoint, we can begin to recognize the essential characteristics of 
pictorial depth, in defiance of the naturalistic presupposition that pictorial depth is 
an illusion. Applying the variational method to a large print of the landscape picture 
in Figure 3, we note the following protocol of reflections on the object’s presence to 
perception:
(1) When changing my viewing angle to the picture from side to side, I notice 
a curiously different quality of spatial depth from the surrounding area of 
the page. At one moment, the picture appears very deep indeed, followed in 
the next instant by an extreme “shallowing” of perceived depth, which never 
reaches complete “flatness.” This first variation or way of looking shows that 
the perception of pictorial depth is not uniform and is affected by changes 
of vantage point; that is, what is seen is affected by how it is seen. The next 
variation probes another aspect of how depth is experienced.
(2) With a little effort, I learn that I can shift my visual concentration on the 
picture to affect the sense of depth I experience: narrowing the center of 
my focus on the picture seems to deepen it; decentering the visual focus 
brings more of the surroundings (the paper) into awareness, which seems to 
reduce the picture’s depth. The deeper the picture appears, the more it takes 
on the aspect of a window, with its landscape receding behind the plane 
of the surrounding white page, and the more the surroundings appear to 
“flatten.” Throughout narrowing and broadening my visual focus, however, 
the picture never appears to be part of the surrounding space; it always 
seems like “foreign territory.”
(3) Further, I notice that the depth of the picture persists through various 
changes of angle of view from side to side; even at an extremely oblique 
angle of view, the picture still has depth, though reduced. In other words, 
pictorial depth resists complete obliteration despite extreme changes of 
viewpoint. In sum, if the visual impression is seen as a picture, it will have at 
least some minimal sense of depth.
(4) Looking at other pictures, I recognize similar performances of pictorial 
depth, with larger pictures or pictures held more closely appearing 
45 Husserl, E. Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology. (W. R. B. Gibson, Trans.). New 
York: Collier Books. 1962. pp. 181–184; Husserl, E.Experience and judgment; Investigations in 
a genealogy of logic. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. 1973. pp. 340–348.
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somewhat deeper. The size of a picture in my visual field has some effect on 
depth perception. If I hold it closely enough to lose the edges of the picture 
in my peripheral vision, the sense of depth is maximized. I conclude that 
seeing the picture without the frame (even though I know it has a frame) 
makes the landscape appear deeper.
(5) I also notice that with practice, it becomes easier to shift my visual “cone” 
of concentration from broadly seeing the entire picture to narrowly 
concentrating on details, and back again.
(6) Suddenly I realize that, without noticing it, I have suspended concern for the 
spatial things (road, guardrail, lake, mountains) depicted in the pictures. I 
am able to look “past” the things and to see the depth directly. 
Note that only Variation (4) changed what was looked at. The other five variations 
changed how it was looked at. All the manipulations influence the depth experience 
and together suggest how pictorial depth is essentially structured. Throughout the 
six variations, the changes in pictorial depth reveal themselves with increasing ease. 
I have begun to see the picture as a phenomenon of consciousness instead of a factual 
thing of reality. Throughout the phenomenological reduction and variational method, 
I never doubt the existence of the pictures, the things depicted in the pictures, or 
the psychological fact that pictorial depth is an illusion; the phenomenological 
reduction I performed psychically neutralized those concerns, so that I could see 
the pictures directly as they essentially appear. I made these discoveries by reflecting 
on the phenomena, while neutralizing all naturalistic assumptions, theories, and 
expectations about them. 
The creative process typically also involves manipulation of perceptual 
standpoint. To manipulate their depth perception, pictorial artists such as painters, 
photographers, and cinematographers typically receive training in essential seeing 
that is very similar to the phenomenological investigative techniques described 
above. They learn to manipulate their “cone of attention” to explore spatio-temporal 
objects in their visual fields. A narrowing of awareness brings surface textures to 
clarity. Broadening or defocusing the visual field partially inhibits depth perception, 
which flattens things in the visual field, and which encourages seeing groups of 
shapes as gestalts or compositions. Artists also purposively manipulate their vision to 
increase contrast by “squinting” their eyes to reduce depth of field, perceived contrast, 
intensity of colors, and textural vividness.46 Producers of audiovisual media exhibit a 
similar facility for shifting perceptual standpoint during the creative process. 
Phenomenology educates a researcher’s perception to perform a specialized 
way of sensing, including looking, hearing, and sense of balance. Both scientific 
and pedestrian sorts of theorizing are avoided. This pre-theoretical sensing requires 
rigorous training to break the theorizing habit. Theories are not shunned because 
46 Martin, T. On sketching technique… tcmsculptures. 2011. [interactive] [accessed April 1, 
2013, at<http://tcmsculptures.com/meanderings/on-sketching/20>
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they are inherently bad or impractical; on the contrary, theories are an essential 
feature of what it means to be human.47
Reviewing phenomenological reduction’s discoveries about pictorial depth 
perception, the natural standpoint assumes that: (a) any two-dimensional thing (such 
as the photograph in Figure 3) has no depth that exists in reality; (b) therefore, any 
perception of depth in a picture is in reality an optical illusion; (c) these naturalistic 
presuppositions are based on fact and are empirically provable; (d) yet, when the 
presuppositions are set aside and a phenomenological reduction of pictorial depth is 
performed, then depth is readily experienced in the picture; and (e) common sense is 
comfortable with the contradiction between the fact of two-dimensionality and the 
experience of three-dimensionality. The fact-world of pictures is totally incompatible 
with the phenomenal world of pictures, yet we routinely accommodate both worlds 
in practical life, particularly in our involvements with screen media. The human 
faculty for pictorial depth is an essential structure of screen sense, and it is good that 
it should be, for otherwise we would not be able to see audiovisual screens as pictures 
with depth.
Before leaving this eidetic reduction of Figure 3’s pictorial depth, three additional 
variations of the phenomenon reveal more about its essential nature:
(7) The next variation alters the spectator’s viewpoint: Try to look at the 
landscape in the figure as it is in reality from the natural standpoint (a flat 
pattern of pigments on the surface of the paper) instead of as a phenomenon 
of the philosophical standpoint (a window onto a depth-laden world). 
Variation (1) above moved the page from side to side; throughout a range of 
viewing angles, the depth perception persisted. For this variation, turn the 
page on its side. Suddenly, apprehension of spatial objects is disoriented: 
the road, lake, and mountains are more difficult to recognize. They threaten 
to lose their “thickness” and to be seen as irregular botches of pigment 
on the surface of the page. (Now, if I permitted naturalistic theories and 
assumptions to penetrate the philosophical standpoint, I would state the 
obvious: the picture is “wrong side up,” i.e., the landscape is defying gravity. 
However, I must resist this inclination and suspend all notions of “correct” 
orientation.) This variation of viewpoint comes very close to obliterating 
pictorial depth, but as opposed to previous variations, the depth has now 
stabilized to a persistent shallowness throughout the range of side-to-side 
changes of viewing angle.
(8) Continue the rotation of the figure so that it is “up-side-down.” The rotation 
for Variation (7) greatly impacted depth perception, but, surprisingly, this 
rotation to an “upside-down” orientation has little effect. “Sideways” or 
“up-side-down,” the depth has the same persistent shallowness. It appears 
that the “right-side-up” orientation is in the background of my perception 
47 Ströker, supra note 30, p. 18.
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of things and that changing the point of view from or to that privileged 
orientation has a big impact on depth perception. The next variation is 
another manipulation of the manner of looking.
(9) Squint when viewing the picture. I immediately notice a blurring of surface 
texture and contours of shapes and an apparent increase in contrast: the 
dark areas look darker and the lightly-shaded area now looks lighter and 
almost (but not quite) blends into the surrounding whiteness of the paper. 
While focusing on the interior of the figure, my cone of attention narrowed. 
By some power of concentration, I can broaden my look to take in the whole 
figure at once. Suddenly, the pictorial depth vanishes, and then returns with 
a re-narrowing of view.
(10) Squinting at the picture that has been rotated back its original orientation 
does not cause pictorial depth to vanish. The landscape clings to its depth 
when I can recognize the things in it.
Summarizing Variations (1) through (10), we can draw the following conclusions 
about pictorial depth: (a) how we look at a picture can affect perception of depth in 
the picture; (b) lateral changes of viewing angle have little effect; (c) broadening the 
“cone of attention” to take in the entire picture, not focusing on any particular part 
of the picture, reduces depth perception; (d) rotating the picture out of “normal” 
orientation nearly eliminates depth perception; and (e) rotation combined with 
squinting the vision can eliminate depth perception altogether, causing the figure to 
appear as blobs of pigment on the surface of the paper. 
Additional, more radical, manipulations of the figure – such as changing the 
colors of the image or its overall shape – might reveal additional essential structures 
of pictorial space, such as the role of body style in sense of orientation. However, 
this rudimentary demonstration of the variational method is sufficient to show 
how reflection on experience, for which naturalistic presuppositions have been 
neutralized, can bring a philosophical way of looking. This mode of reflection makes 
the experience seem strange, and in that strangeness the essential structures of the 
experience are brought into view. 
Compare the elongated retinal impressions of the figure that inevitably result 
from oblique viewpoints and the relatively stable visual thing as apprehended: 
perception intuits its objects in true wholeness, not in fractured pieces of objects. If 
the naturalistic explanations of psychology were correct—if visual perception were 
merely the retina’s response to light striking it, with attendant neural processes – 
then the changes of viewing angle would disrupt things we see. Figure 4 represents 
the inevitable contradictions between the visual stimuli received and the object 
apprehended – so-called perspectival adumbrations.48
Spectators at an oblique angle to the picture plane receive elongated visual 
impressions; nevertheless, they experience a whole, undistorted screen image. This 
48 Husserl, supra note 12, pp. 117–120.
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allowance for viewing angle is natural and taken for granted. Note that the simplified 
view of matters in Figure 4 does not depict psychological contradictions between eye-
images transmitted to the brain and consequent mind-images, including inversion of 
retinal projections, contextualized color rendering, and binocular stereoscopy. 
Figure 4. Perspectival adumbrations of screen spectating. Illustration by author.
In addition to perspectival adumbrations, screen perception entails numerous 
other complexities to be examined elsewhere, but this demonstration of the 
variational method applied to pictorial experience is sufficient to warrant two 
important conclusions at this preliminary stage of the phenomenological/eidetic 
reductions: (a) we are not passive receptors of visual data—consciousness plays some 
part in the perceptual process in ways that require careful analysis; and (b) the epoché 
and variational method help to reveal this essential activity of consciousness.
Conclusion 
The preceding methodological critique scrutinizes Husserlian phenomenology 
from the perspectives of two other research paradigms – positivism and psychologism 
– and concludes that phenomenology is the best research method for investigating 
visual perception of screen media, or screen sense. This conclusion is based on the 
following reasons: (a) screen sense is neither a physical fact of the material world 
(positivism) nor a mental construct of psychic processes (psychologism); rather, 
screen sense is an active collaboration “in-between” a spectator-subject and an 
audiovisual screen-object (phenomenology); (b) positivism and psychologism 
presuppose various “common sense” assumptions about existence and reality in the 
natural standpoint that can inhibit true understanding of the meaning of spectating, 
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as in, for example, when exchanging glances with a screen performer (direct address); 
(c) Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction or epoché serves to neutralize 
presuppositions of the natural standpoint, enabling reflection to behold screen sense 
just as it is, in wonder and utter strangeness, with nothing taken for granted; and (d) 
Husserl’s variational method of eidetic reduction moves the investigation of screen 
sense beyond the task of neutralizing naturalistic presuppositions to reveal essential 
structures of spectating experience.
Screen media are purveyors of pictures. Phenomenology can elucidate the 
pictorial experience they provide. An eidetic reduction of pictorial depth reveals that 
how we look at the screen can affect perception of depth in the screen image. Lateral 
changes of viewing angle have little effect. Broadening one’s “cone of attention” to 
take in the entire screen reduces depth perception. Rotating the screen image nearly 
eliminates depth perception, and squinting eliminates it altogether. Variations in an 
experience of pictorial depth demonstrate that we are more than passive receptors of 
visual data, and that how we see affects what we see.
This introduction to the phenomenological method raises important questions 
for investigation of screen sense that are beyond the scope of this paper, questions that 
hint at the complex nature of screen sense in particular and human science in general. 
Husserl’s phenomenological method makes great demands on communication 
research for intellectual integrity, historical understanding of the discipline, highly 
technical language, and careful, sensitive approach to phenomena under study. In 
return, phenomenology promises to provide a rich understanding of visual perception 
of screen media that is free of assumptions, open to criticism of other disciplines, and 
dedicated to achieving an authentic, unified investigation.
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